Wednesday, December 28, 2016
Tuesday, December 27, 2016
Behind the Real US Strategic Blunder in SyriaPresident Barack Obama has long been under fire from the US national security elite and the media for failing to intervene aggressively against the Assad regime.
President Barack Obama has long been under fire from the US national security elite and the media for failing to intervene aggressively against the Assad regime.
But the real strategic blunder was not that Barack Obama didn’t launch yet another war in Syria, but that he decided to go along with the ambitions of America's Sunni allies to create and arm a Syrian opposition army to overthrow the regime in the first place.
Now a former Obama administration official who is knowledgeable on the internal discussions on Syria policy, speaking to this writer on condition of anonymity, has shed new light on how and why that fateful decision was made.
The former official revealed that when Obama made the first move toward supporting the arming of Syrian opposition forces, the president failed to foresee the risk of a direct Iranian or Russian intervention on behalf of the Syrian regime in response to an externally armed opposition – because his advisors had failed to take this likelihood into account themselves.
The story of this policy failure begins after military resistance to the Assad regime began in spring and summer 2011.
In August 2011, national security officials began urging Obama to call on Assad to step down, according to the former official.
Obama did make a statement suggesting that Assad should step aside, but he made it clear privately that he had no intention of doing anything about it. “He viewed it as simply a suggestion, not a hard policy,” the ex-official said.
But soon after that, a bigger issue arose for the administration’s policy: how to respond to pressure from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for a US commitment to help overthrow Assad.
In September 2011, the Saudis and Turks not only wanted the US to provide arms to the opposition. “They wanted the US to provide anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles,” recalled the ex-official.
Turkey even offered to send troops into Syria to overthrow Assad, but only if US and NATO agreed to create a “no-fly zone” to protect them.
But Obama refused to provide US arms to the Syrian rebels and also opposed the Sunni foes of Assad providing such heavy weapons. “He wasn’t willing to go along with anything except small arms,” said the former official.
Apparently to assuage the dissatisfaction of the Sunni allies, then-director of the CIA David Petraeus devised a plan, which Obama approved, to help move the small arms from Libyan government stocks in Benghazi to Turkey.
Confirming the 2014 story by Seymour Hersh, the ex- official, recalled, “It was highly secret but officials involved in the Middle East learned of the programme by word of mouth.”
The combination of those two policy decisions committed Obama – albeit half-heartedly- to the armed overthrow of the Assad regime.
The former administration official confirmed the recollections of both former secretary of state Hillary Clinton and former Pentagon official Derek Chollet that Obama’s advisers believed Assad’s fall was inevitable.
Some of those advisers believed Assad lacked the “cunning and fortitude” to remain in power, as Chollet put it.
Underestimating Iran and Russia
More importantly, when Obama was making crucial Syria policy decisions in September 2011, no one on his national security team warned him that Iran had a very major national security interest in keeping the Assad regime in power that could draw the Iranians into the war, according to the former official.
Obama’s advisers assumed instead that neither Iran nor Russia would do more than offer token assistance to keep Assad in power, so there was no risk of an endless, bloody sectarian war.
“Both Hezbollah and Iran had made noises that they were displeased with Assad’s handling of the crisis, and [Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah even said publicly he should take a softer approach,” the ex-official recalled, “so it was believed Iran would not intervene militarily to save him.”
In fact, however, Iran regarded Syria as crucial to its ability to resupply Hezbollah, whose large arsenal of missiles was in turn a necessary element in Iran’s deterrent to an Israeli attack. “Syria had been Iran’s and Hezbollah’s security in depth,” the ex-official said, but Obama's advisers “didn’t have a clue” about Iran’s overriding national security interest in preventing Assad’s overthrow by the overwhelmingly Sunni opposition backed by a Sunni international coalition with US support.
That major error of omission become obvious as the war unfolded. After the city of Qusayr near the Lebanese border was taken over by the Free Syrian Army in July 2012, opposition forces in southern Syria were able to get military supplies from across the border in Lebanon. It became clear in the months that followed that al-Nusra Front forces were heavily involved in that front of the war.
Hezbollah strikes back
In May 2013, Hezbollah troops from the Bekaa Valley intervened in support of a regime counteroffensive to retake the city – obviously at Iranian urging.
That Iranian-Hezbollah intervention resulted in the biggest defeat of rebel forces of the war up to that time.
But instead of questioning the soundness of the original decision to cooperate with the Sunni coalition’s regime change strategy, Obama’s national security team doubled down on its bet.
Secretary of State John Kerry put strong pressure on Obama to use military force against the Assad regime.
That resulted in a public commitment by the Obama administration in June 2013 to provide military support to the opposition for the first time. The deepening commitment nearly led to a new US war against the Assad regime in September, after the chemical attack on the Damascus suburbs in August 2013.
The Obama administration even agreed to the Sunni states’ provision of anti-tank weapons to an armed opposition now openly dominated by al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front.
That culminated in a Nusra Front-led command’s conquest of Idlib province and the subsequent Russian intervention, which the administration’s national security team obviously had not anticipated either.
Obama and his advisers blundered on Syria in thinking that they were not getting into a high-risk war situation.
But there is a deeper level of explanation for the willingness of Obama and his advisers to go along with the inherent risk of another regime change policy – even if Obama was half-hearted about it at best and limited direct US involvement in it.
The administration was unwilling to be at cross-purposes with its Sunni allies, the former official recalled, because of the direct US military interests at stake in its alliances with those three states: the Saudis effectively controlled US access to the naval base in Bahrain, Turkey controlled the airbase at Incirlik, and Qatar controlled land and air bases that had become central to US military operations in the region.
What was a disastrous blunder in terms of the consequences for the Syrian people, therefore, was the only choice acceptable to the powerful national security institutions that constitute what has become the US permanent war state.
Their first concern was to ensure that existing military and intelligence arrangements and relationships were not jeopardised.
And Obama was not prepared to override that concern, despite his well-known skepticism about any arming of anti-Assad rebels in light of the blowback from America's support for the Afghan Mujahidin in the 1980s.
Gareth Porter is an independent investigative journalist and winner of the 2012 Gellhorn Prize for journalism. He is the author of the newly published Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
December 27, 2016
Obama's Hatred for Israel
The anti-Israel U.N. resolution of December 23, 2016, which the United States abstained from, is the crowning glory of an anti-Semitic and anti-American administration. It is the coda to a dismal eight years from a radical leftist regime that holds a Hanukkah lighting ceremony at the White House while seeking to obliterate the Jewish homeland.
It is totally to be expected from a president whose seething animus for all things Jewish was evident from his very first days in office. It will remain a moment of shame for America.
On November 10, 1975, U.N. ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan eloquently showed American exceptionalism when he rose to declare the "infamous act" of the United Nations, which had equated "Zionism with racism." Moynihan called the action "obscene" and asserted that "there will be time enough to contemplate the harm this act will have done the United Nations."
Since that time, the U.N. has become a cesspool of tyrants who do nothing but serve the interests of dictatorships across the globe. The U.N. continues to look the other way as Palestinian children are fed a daily diet of anti-American and anti-Semitic material whose result is seen daily as bombs explode all over the world killing the infidels.
Moynihan knew that in 1975 "a great evil ha[d] been loosed upon the world" as he acknowledged that "the abomination of antisemitism has been given the appearance of international sanction."
Moynihan understood the power of language and insisted on stating the "actual truth." Thus, as Aaron Klein explains, it must be understood that the text of this hateful 2016 resolution "wrongly refers to the West Bank and eastern sections of Jerusalem as 'Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.' In actuality, the Palestinians never had a state in either the West Bank or eastern Jerusalem and they are not legally recognized as the undisputed authority in those areas."
Jordan occupied and annexed the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem from 1948 until Israel captured the lands in a defensive war in 1967 after Arab countries used the territories to launch attacks against the Jewish state. In 1988 Jordan officially renounced its claims to the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem.The text of the resolution declares that the Israeli settlement enterprise has 'no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-state solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.' It calls for Israel to 'immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.'
As we approach 2017, we are reminded that in 1975, when the General Assembly granted "symbolic amnesty – and more – to the murderers of the six million European Jews, it merely made acceptable evil enough in itself, but more ominous by far is the realization that now presses upon us – the realization that if there were no General Assembly, this could never have happened."
As Benjamin Netanyahu has stated, "at a time when the Security Council does nothing to stop the slaughter of half a million people in Syria, it disgracefully gangs up on the one true democracy in the Middle East, Israel, and calls the Western Wall 'occupied territory.'"
Hence, it is the duty of the United States – in fact, the moral obligation – to end the infamous reign of the United Nations because we are financially supporting an organization that encourages this evil. At U.N. Watch, one learns that the UNRWA's "teachers, principals and other staff continually spread racial hatred, anti-Semitism and support for terrorism," as documented in reports that have identified more than 30 individual perpetrators.
Thus, Obama not only failed to protect Israel against the gang-up at the U.N., but "colluded" with the United Nations behind the scenes to promote this dastardly decision. In fact, "the Obama administration secretly worked with the Palestinian Authority" to craft the resolution.
Obama and Samantha Power have thrown the United States in with odious regimes where human rights are continually trampled by claiming that "the settlements have no legality." It is a shameful act, and it "is a lie."
But what is to be expected from a president for whom everything is racist until he says otherwise? For him, the very existence of Israel is racist because there is a tiny minority of people who refuse to bow to the dictates of dhimmitude, of which he is so fond. No matter that Israel is the only country to have saved more black Africans over the years than any Muslim-dominated country. The hate that oozed from Edward Said, Rashid Khalidi, and Reverend Wright, mentors of the 44th president, found a comfortable niche within Obama's heart, and his actions display this prejudice on a regular basis.
Forty-one years ago, the prescient Moynihan understood the following:
The terrible lie that has been told here today will have terrible consequences. Not only will people begin to say, indeed they have already begun to say that the United Nations is a place where lies are told, but far more serious, grave and perhaps irreparable harm will be done to the cause of human rights itself. The harm will arise first because it will strip from racism the precise and abhorrent meaning that it still precariously holds today. How will the people of the world feel about racism and the need to struggle against it, when they are told that it is an idea as broad as to include the Jewish national liberation movement?There is this danger, and then a final danger that is the most serious of all. Which is that the damage we now do to the idea of human rights and the language of human rights could well be irreversible.
And has not Obama repeatedly damaged language with his euphemisms that subvert the truth? But governed by the ideas of the left, Obama runs counter to the idea that human rights mean "that man [is] a being whose existence [is] independent from that of the State, that he need join a political community only if he did not lose by that association more than he gained. From this very specific political philosophy stemmed the idea of political rights, of claims that the individual could justly make against the state; it was because the individual was seen as so separate from the State that he could make legitimate demands upon it."
For a man whose aim has been to enlarge governmental power over the people, the idea of genuine human rights is an anathema. And Israel with her incredible moral compass is a thorn in Obama's side.
While the 1975 "Zionism is Racism" resolution was eventually revoked, its shadow continues to be cast with every anti-Israel vote made in the United Nations. The overwhelming condemnations made at the United Nations are always directed against Israel, notwithstanding the monstrous acts committed in Afghanistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Iran!
Instead of hearing the words "the United States of America declares that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act," we now have to do everything in our power to overturn yet another wicked anti-Jewish action.
It is not soon enough that Obama leaves office. His trail of destruction leaves America a far more dangerous place, and his moral cowardice will be remembered in the annals of iniquity.
Eileen can be contacted at firstname.lastname@example.org.
UN Security Council Resolution 242 Adopted: November 22, 1967
Eli E. Hertz
Resolution 242 is the cornerstone for what it calls “a just and lasting peace.” It calls for a negotiated solution based on “secure and recognized boundaries” – recognizing the flaws in Israel’s previous temporary borders – the 1948 Armistice lines or the “Green Line”1 – by not calling upon Israel to withdraw from ‘all occupied territories,’ but rather “from territories occupied.” The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 in 1967 following the Six-Day War.2 It followed Israel’s takeover of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan. The resolution was to become the foundation for future peace negotiations. Yet contrary to Arab contentions, a careful examination of the resolution will show that it does not require Israel to return to the June 4, 1967 Armistice lines or “Green Line.” Resolution 242 was approved on November 22, 1967, more than five months after the war. Although Israel launched a pre-emptive and surprise strike at Egypt on June 5, 1967, this was a response to months of belligerent declarations and actions by its Arab neighbors that triggered the war: 465,000 enemy troops, more than 2,880 tanks and 810 aircrafts, preparing for war, surrounded Israel in the weeks leading up to June 5, 1967. In addition, Egypt had imposed an illegal blockade against Israeli shipping by closing the Straits of Tiran, the Israeli outlet to the Red Sea and Israel’s only supply route to Asia – an act of aggression – in total violation of international law. In legal parlance, those hostile acts are recognized by the Law of Nations as a casus belli [Latin: Justification for acts of war]. The Arab measures went beyond mere power projection. Arab states did not plan merely to attack Israel to dominate it or grab territory; their objective was to destroy Israel. Their own words leave no doubt as to this intention. The Arabs meant to annihilate a neighboring state and fellow member of the UN by force of arms:3 • “We intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim will be to destroy Israel.” (Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, May 26, 1967) • “The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence.”
(Egyptian Radio, ‘Voice of the Arabs,’ May 18, 1967)
© 2009, Eli E. Hertz 1 UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz
UN Security Council Resolution 242• “I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation.” (Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad, May 20, 1967) • “The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. ... Our goal is clear – to wipe Israel off the map.” (Iraqi President Abdur Rahman Aref, May 31, 1967) Arab declarations about destroying Israel were made preceding the war when control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (or Sinai and the Golan Heights) were not in Israel’s hands, and no so-called Israeli occupation existed. That is why the UN Security Council recognized that Israel had acquired the territory from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria not as a matter of aggression, but as an act of self-defense. That is also why Resolution 242 was passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter rather than Chapter VII. As explained above, UN resolutions adopted under Chapter VI call on nations to negotiate settlements, while resolutions under the more stringent Chapter VII section deal with clear acts of aggression that allow the UN to enforce its resolutions upon any state seen as threatening the security of another state or states. Although Resolution 242 refers to “the inadmissibility” of acquiring territory by war, a statement used in nearly all UN resolutions relating to Israel, Professor, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, explains that the principle of “acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible” must be read together with other principles: “… namely, that no legal right shall spring from a wrong, and the Charter principle that the Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”4 Resolution 242 immediately follows to emphasize the “need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.” While Resolution 242 may call upon Israel to withdraw from territory it captured during the war, the UN recognized that Israel cannot return to the non-secure borders existing before the Six-Day War that invited aggression – frontiers that the usually mild-mannered and eloquent former Israeli diplomat, the late Abba Eban, branded “Auschwitz borders.” The Meaning of the Words “All” & “The” As noted above, the UN adopted Resolution 242 in late November 1967, five months after the Six-Day War ended. It took that long because intense and deliberate negotiations were needed to carefully craft a document that met the Arabs’ demand for a return of land, and Israel’s requirement that the Arabs recognize Israel’s legitimacy, to make a lasting peace. It also took that long because each word in the resolution was deliberately chosen, and certain words were deliberately omitted, according to negotiators who drafted the resolution. © 2009, Eli E. Hertz
UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 2 UN Security Council Resolution 242So although Arab officials claim Resolution 242 requires Israel to withdraw from all territory it captured in June 1967, nowhere in the resolution is that demand delineated. Nor did those involved in the negotiations and drafting of the resolution want such a requirement. Instead, they say Resolution 242 explicitly and intentionally omitted the terms ‘the territories’ or ‘all territories.’ The wording of UN Resolution 242 clearly reflects the contention that none of the territories were occupied territories taken by force in an unjust war. Because the Arabs were clearly the aggressors, nowhere in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 is Israel branded as an invader or unlawful occupier of the territories. The minutes of the six month ‘debate’ over the wording of Resolution 242, as noted above, showing that draft resolutions attempted to brand Israel an aggressor and illegal occupier as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War, were all defeated by either the UN General Assembly or the Security Council. Professor Eugene Rostow, then U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, went on record in 1991 to make this clear: “Resolution 242, which as undersecretary of state for political affairs between 1966 and 1969 I helped produce, calls on the parties to make peace and allows Israel to administer the territories it occupied in 1967 until ‘a just and lasting peace in the Middle East’ is achieved. When such a peace is made, Israel is required to withdraw its armed forces ‘from territories’ it occupied during the Six-Day War - not from ‘the’ territories nor from ‘all’ the territories, but from some of the territories, which included the Sinai Desert, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.” Professor Rostow continues and describes: “Five-and-a-half months of vehement public diplomacy in 1967 made it perfectly clear what the missing definite article in Resolution 242 means. Ingeniously drafted resolutions calling for withdrawals from ‘all’ the territories were defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Speaker after speaker made it explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the ‘fragile’ and ‘vulnerable’ Armistice Demarcation Lines [‘Green Line’], but should retire once peace was made to what Resolution 242 called ‘secure and recognized’ boundaries …”5 Lord Caradon, then the United Kingdom Ambassador to the UN and the key drafter of the resolution, said several years later: “We knew that the boundaries of ’67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers; they were a cease-fire line of a couple decades earlier. We did not say the ’67 boundaries must be forever.” Referring to Resolution 242, Lord Caradon added: “The essential phrase which is not sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did. It was not for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border © 2009, Eli E. Hertz
UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 3 UN Security Council Resolution 242very well. It is not a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent boundary ... "6 In a 1974 statement he said: “It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of 4 June 1967. … That's why we didn't demand that the Israelis return to them and I think we were right not to.”7 It is true, as Arab leaders correctly note, that certain suggested drafts of Resolution 242 exist that contain that tiny controversial “the” in reference to territories. Arab leaders say this proves that Israel must withdraw from all territories captured in 1967. However, those versions of the resolution are in French. Under international law, English-language versions are followed and accepted as the conclusive reference point, and French versions are not. Arthur J. Goldberg,8 the U.S. Ambassador to the UN in 1967 and a key draftee of Resolution 242, stated: “The notable omissions in language used to refer to withdrawal are the words the, all, and the June 5, 1967 lines. I refer to the English text of the resolution. The French and Soviet texts differ from the English in this respect, but the English text was voted on by the Security Council, and thus it is determinative. In other words, there is lacking a declaration requiring Israel to withdraw from the (or all the) territories occupied by it on and after June 5, 1967. Instead, the resolution stipulates withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal. And it can be inferred from the incorporation of the words secure and recognized boundaries that the territorial adjustments to be made by the parties in their peace settlements could encompass less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories.”9 Political figures and international jurists have discussed the existence of “permissible” or “legal occupations.” In a seminal article on this question, entitled What Weight to Conquest, Professor, Judge Schwebel wrote: “A state [Israel] acting in lawful exercise of its right of self-defense may seize and occupy foreign territory as long as such seizure and occupation are necessary to its self-defense. … Where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title. “As between Israel, acting defensively in 1948 and 1967, on the one hand, and her Arab neighbors, acting aggressively, in 1948 and 1967, on the other, Israel has the better title in the territory of what was Palestine, including the whole of Jerusalem, than do Jordan and Egypt.”10 Professor Julius Stone, a leading authority on the Law of Nations, has concurred, further clarifying: “Territorial Rights Under International Law. ... By their [Arab countries] armed attacks against the State of Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, and by various acts of belligerency throughout this period, these Arab states flouted their basic obligations as United Nations members to refrain from threat or use of force against Israel’s territorial integrity and political independence. These acts were in © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 4 UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz
UN Security Council Resolution 242flagrant violation inter alia of Article 2(4) and paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of the same article.”11 If the West Bank and Gaza were indeed occupied territory – belonging to someone else and unjustly seized by force – there could be no grounds for negotiating new borders. The Drafting History of 242 Shows it Pertains to all Refugees – Jewish and Arab Lastly, Resolution 242 speaks of “a just settlement of the refugee problem,” not ‘the Palestinian or Arab refugee problem.’ The history of the resolution shows that it was intentional and reflected recognition that the Arab-Israeli conflict created two refugee populations, not one. Parallel to the estimated 600,000 Arabs who left Israel, more than 899,00012 Jews fled from Arab countries in the aftermath of the 1948 war – 650,000 of them finding asylum in Israel. A history of the behind-the-scenes work drafting the resolution shows that the former Soviet Union Ambassador Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov sought to restrict the term ‘just settlement’ to Palestinian refugees only. But former U.S. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the American Ambassador to the UN who played a key role in the ultimate language adopted, pointed out: “A notable omission in 242 is any reference to Palestinians, a Palestinian state on the West Bank or the PLO. The resolution addresses the objective of ‘achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.’ This language presumably refers both to Arab and Jewish refugees, for about an equal number of each abandoned their homes as a result of the several wars.”13 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 5 UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz
UN Security Council Resolution 242Appendix A - UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. Adopted unanimously at the 1382 meeting © 2009, Eli E. Hertz
UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 6 UN Security Council Resolution 242 1 The boundaries were l Israel’s pre-1967 borders reflected the deployment of Israeli and Arab forces on the ground after Israel’s War of Independence in 1948. Professor Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, the former President of the International Court of Justice clarified in his writings Justice in International Law that the 1949 armistice demarcation lines are not permanent borders: “The armistice agreements of 1949 expressly preserved the territorial claims of all parties and did not purport to establish definitive boundaries between them.” abeled the “Green Line” merely because a green pencil was used to draw the map of the armistice borders. 2 See Appendix “A” - full text of UN Resolution 242. 3 Disputed Territories: Forgotten Facts about the West Bank and Gaza Strip, MFA, February 2003, www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/11741.htm 4 Judge Schwebel, “What Weight to Conquest?” in Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Opinions quoted in this article are not derived from his position as a judge of the ICJ. 5 Professor Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 1993. Professor Rostow was Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs Emeritus at Yale University and served as the Dean of Yale Law School (1955-66); Distinguished Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University; Adjunct Fellow, American Enterprise Institute. In 1967 as U.S. UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs he become a key draftee of the UN Security Council Resolution 242. 6 Lord Caradon, interviewed on Kol Israel (The Voice of Israel Radio) in February 1973. Lord Caradon (Sir Hugh Foot) was the UK representative to the UN in 1967. His final draft becomes the foundation for UN Resolution 242.
Lord Caradon to the Beirut Daily Star on 12 June 1974. 8 Arthur J. Goldberg, was a professor of law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago. He was appointed in 1962 to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1965 he was appointed U.S. representative to the United Nations. Judge Goldberg was a key draftee of UN Resolution 242. 9 Judge Goldberg. U.N. Resolution 242: Origin, Meaning, and Significance. National Committee on American Foreign Policy. See article at: www.mefacts.com/cache/html/arab-countries/10159.htm. (10159) 10 Professor, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, “What Weight to Conquest?” in Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Opinions quoted in this critiques are not derived from his position as a judge of the ICJ. 11 Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 12 The New York Times. “Jews in Grave Danger in all Moslem Lands” May 19, 1948. 13 Judge Goldberg, Resolution 242 After Twenty Years at: . (10789) www.mefacts.com/cached.asp?x_id=10789 This document uses extensive links via the Internet. If you experience a broken link, please note the 5 digit number (xxxxx) at the end of the URL and use it as a Keyword in the Search Box at: www.MEfacts.com © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 7 UN Security Council Resolution 242 © 2009, Eli E. Hertz 7 UN Security Council Resolution 242